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Abstract 
In the past two decades, controversial evidence has been produced supporting the case for local 
protectionism in China. This paper overviews the most important contributions and presents a new 
approach which applies spatial econometrics on prefectural-level data. The main advantage of this 
method is to rely on a theoretically less biased and internal benchmark for assessing the impact of 
provincial borders on spatial interdependences, as we compare within province and across prov-
ince growth spillovers for neighbouring prefectures.  We show that provincial borders exert a 
strong  impact  on  spillovers.  Further,  we  also  analyze  spillovers  of  local  public expenditures, 
which could be interpreted as proxies for government interventions. Again, provincial borders 
matter. Yet, we are cautious in interpreting this as evidence for local protectionism, and propose 
the notion of ‘cellularity’ as an alternative explanation. Cellularity results from a confluence of 
different factors, such as administrative structure, institutional changes and regional culture. 
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1  The strange story about China’s transition to a less integrated market sys-
tem 
Since  Alwyn  Young  (2000)  published  his  influential  research  on  economic  fragmentation  in 
China, the issue has received much attention in the literature. It is of central importance for the 
assessment of the Chinese transition to the market. For example, in the context of the WTO the 
question is contentious whether local governments undermine transnational agreements by inter-
fering locally into domestic trade. However, it is extremely difficult to establish this as an empiri-
cal fact, because direct information on local interventions is patchy and inconclusive in all dimen-
sions, reaching from the forms of interventions to the level of government on which they are sup-
posed to occur (Holz 2009). Therefore, a reliable quantitative approach to assess the general level 
of market integration is necessary. 
In the recent decade, much progress was achieved in this field by broadening the scope of data 
and by applying more sophisticated econometric tools. However, the literature suffers from the 
time gaps in data availability, so that most published research so far does not apply for the period 
after WTO entry. Further, increasing degrees of sophistication also come with complex assump-
tions about causalities, which sometimes also increase the difficulties of interpreting the data, in 
spite of often strong statements by the researchers. These problems spring to the eye if one con-
siders the fact that different methodologies arrive at different conclusions, as we shall see in more 
detail below: For example, research based on the measurement of trade barriers across provinces 
does not concur with results about business cycle synchronization. 
This state of the art shows that there is much scope for improvement. In this paper, we present a 
new approach. Novelty mainly refers to our data base: We move beyond the unit of the province 
and analyse prefectural level integration. The main advantage of this approach is that we do not 
need to refer to external theoretical benchmarks or to inter-temporal comparisons to establish re-
sults about integration. Our benchmark is extracted from the current Chinese conditions. We ar-
gue that the effects of administrative borders between neighbouring prefectures should not differ 
substantially between the cases of intra-provincial prefectures and the cases of neighbouring pre-
fectures belonging to different provinces. So, our benchmark is intra-provincial integration. As to 
the indicator, we choose growth spillovers which can be estimated via spatial econometrics tech-
niques. These techniques are relatively free from theoretical presumptions about the underlying 
economic process (e.g. economies of scale) and include the standard growth determinants in the 
controls. This selection is certainly theoretically informed, but does not make strong commitments 
to the underlying model of growth. State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 137  5 
 
We also think that given the limited knowledge about actual policy interventions, we should be 
very careful with drawing conclusions about local protectionism, also in consideration of the po-
tentially strong impact on external economic policies of partner countries of China. As we will 
discuss in the next section, there is a long way to go from certain measures of integration to the 
claim that local protectionism is the most significant determinant. We have to distinguish neatly 
between ‘inward orientations’ in general and all border effects which are created intentionally by 
policy interventions. For this reason, our study includes one series of statistical estimations that 
consider one clear-cut policy variable: local public expenditures. Again, this variable is free from 
strong theoretical presumptions. It seems reasonable to assume that local expenditures exert a 
positive impact on local growth, and under normal conditions one would also expect an impact on 
growth in neighbouring spatial units. So, again, our benchmark is an internal one: We compare 
growth effects of public expenditures in different sets of neighbourhoods. If these are limited to an 
‘unnatural’ degree, we regard this as a strong hint at local protectionism.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we present a brief analytical assessment of the litera-
ture. Section 3 introduces our methodology and data set. Section 4 is the main part of the paper 
and reports about a series of spatial econometric tests. Section 5 concludes. We are able to show 
that China manifests a strong impact of provincial borders on spatial interdependence of growth. 
This is also true for local expenditures. Even the most liberalized Eastern coastal provinces reveal 
a low degree of cross-provincial integration. So, China appears to be an economic federation of 
provincial economies and less a highly integrated economic system with a strong central govern-
ment fostering and even enforcing economic integration. Yet, we remain careful in interpreting 
this as an equally strong evidence for local protectionism, because there are also convincing rea-
sons why a stronger inward orientation of provincial economies may be a normal feature at this 
stage of China’s development. 
 
2  The  state  of  the  art:  Increasing  methodological  sophistication,  but  no 
clear-cut conclusions 
Since the early analysis by the World Bank (1994), the issue of market integration has been the 
object of numerous contributions applying different methodologies. Basically, we can distinguish 
between four approaches: 
−  Structural convergence of industries across provinces; 
−  Inter-provincial trade and trade barriers; State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
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−  Convergence of prices; 
−  Synchronization of business cycles. 
Of these, the first two approaches are closely related, because the underlying theory is the same: 
Intra-regional and external trade flows cause structural adaptations of industries, and industrial 
structure reflects comparative advantages of provinces. Further, these approaches also show the 
most sophisticated pattern of reasoning because they commonly also try to include indirect meas-
ures of local government behaviour. This is possible because in the literature on the political 
economy of Chinese transition, the argument is commonplace that local protectionism is directly 
determined by certain incentives which are industry-specific. For example, some authors argue 
that certain industries have a higher tax plus profit margin, so that incentives for local protection-
ism are stronger (Bai et al. 2004). So, if perceived distortions of industry structure fit into the pat-
tern of tax-for-profit-margins, a case for local protectionism is made. 
The methodological challenges of market integration research are most evident from comparing 
Young’s seminal paper with a recent comprehensive criticism by Holz (2009). This is also a wor-
rying example about the possible contradictions between the speed of academic publishing and its 
possible impact on politics. Holz’ paper goes back on research in the mid-2000’s, published for 
the first time in a working paper of 2006. In his original contribution, Young presents a combina-
tion of most of the methodologies that we have listed above. His conclusions were stark and far-
reaching: Starting out from a collection of observations on local interventions in inter-provincial 
trade, he based his case for local protectionism firstly on data about structural convergence of 
industries, next on data about price convergence and finally on data about productivity differen-
tials and sectoral specialization, especially in agriculture. Young makes strong claims to be able to 
show that the story about Chinese marketization between 1978 and the late 1990s is based on a 
delusion, and that in fact only the locus of government control was shifted from the central to the 
local governments. His empirical arguments mainly rests upon: firstly, the demonstration that 
sectoral output shares converged, thus violating comparative advantage, secondly, that price dis-
persion as measured in standard deviations of log prices increased or showed irregular fluctua-
tions, thus in any case violating the Law of one Price as a measure of market integration, and 
thirdly, that Chinese provinces have become more dissimilar in terms of productivities, which is 
especially true for agriculture, which, again, violates neoclassical trade theory. 
Young’s paper was based on earlier working papers that certainly exerted a strong impact on the 
informed public, especially taking into consideration that the World Bank (1994) had already 
pointed at similar observations. Criticism also set in immediately, as, for example, ventilated by 
Barry Naughton (2003), one of the world’s leading experts on the Chinese economy. Up to now, State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
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Holz’ assessment is the most comprehensive one. According to Holz, the major difficulties with 
the Young approach are: 
−  The argument of the sectoral composition exclusively depends on neoclassical trade 
theory on a very high level of aggregation. If the level of industries is considered, there 
is much more diversification across Chinese provinces, and there is also an increasing 
importance of intra-industry trade which would not affect the sectoral composition on 
the highest level of aggregation. 
−  The price dispersion argument is methodologically less sophisticated than state of the 
art tests of the Law of one Price. The Young data can be easily explained by consider-
ing the different policy changes in the 1980s and 1990s which strongly affected the 
price  system,  and  this  differentially  across  the  years.  Furthermore,  there  is  no  un-
equivocal relation between price convergence/divergence and local government inter-
ventions. Local governments may also impose similar prices for similar goods, for 
many reasons. 
−  The data on productivities are inconclusive and depend, among others, on industries 
chosen; in the special case of agriculture Young confuses movements of yields with 
movements of excess supply, which only could explain price movements, and which, 
however, is not observable. Further, Young’s measurements are strongly influenced by 
the performance of less developed Western provinces, in which the relation between 
yield increases and growth of labour input may be determined by high barriers to exit 
from agriculture. 
Overviewing the entire literature on market integration in China, we can say that the results pro-
vide a very complex picture, which is a far cry from Young’s pretensions.  
To begin with the field where the mist seems less thick, there are relatively strong results about 
price convergence in China. In comparison with Young, these are based on panel data unit root 
tests and non linear mean reversion, which can take account of the fact that there are many rea-
sons for absolute price convergence to fail exactly, so that relative price convergence is more 
powerful to test whether there are barriers to price arbitrage, especially in the longer run. Based on 
this methodology, Fan and Wei (2006) showed that China shows the expected patterns of the 
LOP, taking the impact of imperfect competition in certain industries into consideration. The data 
cover a period between 1993 and 2003, which clearly supports the view that China underwent 
market liberalization during that time (for a related result, with a different methodology testing for 
the impact of common shocks relative to province-specific determinants, see Xu and Voon, 2003). State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
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There is even evidence that prices converge more in case of industries where there is an a priori 
suspicion of strong incentives for local government intervention (processed industrial materials 
and durable goods and vehicles).  
On the other hand, some research on the LOP (Ritola 2008) also produces counterintuitive results, 
in particular on regional clustering: It seems that the most developed regions are less integrated 
internally than the less developed regions. This observation shows that a possible explanation of 
integration patterns may be that in less developed regions, there is still a stronger impact of ad-
ministrative procedures, which also support price convergence, whereas in the developed regions 
market dynamics (imperfect competition, growing diversification of demand, etc.) supports price 
divergence, at least temporarily (i.e. the medium-run). This flatly contradicts the local protection-
ism story which builds on the assumption of strong administrative interference, which is supposed 
to result into price divergence. 
The other strand of literature which produces relatively clear-cut results is on macroeconomic 
interdependences. This is also an example for the impact of the choice of level of aggregation, and 
the impact of the chosen methodology. Golley and Groenewold (2007) analyse the long-run inter-
dependence  of  growth  across  Chinese  macroregions  and  confirm  the  standard  result  that  the 
Western regions are less integrated with the rest of China than the more developed regions. How-
ever, as they use a vector autoregressive model, they need to rely on a full series of data mixing 
the pre-reform and post-reform period, which does not allow identifying changes in the recent 
years. Further, a lower degree of integration of less developed regions is certainly what can be 
easily explained by gaps in infrastructure development and related factors such as communication, 
and does not point towards policy variables necessarily. Indeed, the business cycle approach im-
plicitly would make very strong assumptions about the benchmark for full integration, which is 
basically the optimum currency area (such as perfect mobility of capital and labour). Only in this 
case, asymmetric external shocks would trigger perfectly synchronous business cycles. As long as 
the Chinese economy remains in some distance from these conditions, one would expect regional 
groupings in the correlation of cycles as natural outcome, which has been demonstrated empiri-
cally by Tang (1998).  
More recently, Poncet and Barthélemy (2008) have applied a more sophisticated approach to iden-
tify also the determinants of desynchronization. But firstly, the good news needs emphasis: China 
experienced a steady increase of the degree of synchronization, and at the time of WTO entry 
China did not appear to differ from other large integrated economies such as the US. This general 
result is sometimes overshadowed by the strong effects of institutional change on business cycle 
dynamics: Thus, the degree of synchronization itself shows fluctuations, because in the second State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
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half of the 1990s provinces showed more divergent paths in institutional change (e.g. privatiza-
tion). Further, there is a strong impact of the external economic factor, which even contributes to a 
larder desynchronization among the developed Eastern provinces as compared to the Western 
provinces. 
It is important to notice that the business cycle approach also leads to some conclusions that con-
tradict with other measures of integration. This is a clear demonstration for the strong dose of 
theory that is always inside the apparently empirical analysis. A common argument, based on 
neoclassical conceptions of comparative advantage, states that increasing integration should lead 
towards increasing spatial specialization of the location of industries. That is, measurement of 
specialization is an indicator of integration (e.g. Bai et al. 2004). However, this implies that exter-
nal shocks will be more asymmetric, so that cycle desynchronization will increase. So we would 
conclude that the economy is less integrated, again, with reference to the standards of the opti-
mum currency area. 
The business cycle literature is also connected with the research about domestic trade integration 
because in a Keynesian macroeconomic framework to business cycles demand pull would appear 
to be a force of synchronization. This implies that domestic barriers to trade would support desyn-
chronization. The difficulty with this, as with all other arguments on domestic trade, is that we do 
not have data about bilateral trade flows. So, Poncet and Bartélemy use freight traffic data as a 
proxy, which is certainly very unreliable, especially through time. 
To summarize, the research about business cycles and the previously abstracted research about the 
law of one price do not support the hypothesis that China is an exceptionally fragmented country. 
Almost all observations about a certain lack of integration can be easily explained as normal phe-
nomena in the process of economic development of an area of the geographical size and complex-
ity as China. There is no unequivocal hint at government intervention as a cause. So, why is the 
opinion so widespread that local protectionism has been even increasing during the transition to 
the market economy? 
Clearly, one would need to distinguish between domestically oriented policies in general and the 
more narrow meaning of protectionism which would normally refer to trade flows. That is, Chi-
nese provinces might be units that, for example, pursue partly autonomous technology policies, 
for sure, but do not necessarily block inter-provincial trade. Separating these different aspects is as 
difficult as it is on the level of global trade policy. The most advanced approaches in determining 
this more specific policy context have been developed by Sandra Poncet’s prolific writings in the 
recent years. Poncet is more cautious than Young, but basically falls into his line of thinking about 
a ‘fragmented China’ (Batisse and Poncet 2004; Poncet 2005). Poncet analyzes the aggregate do-State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
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mestic trade performance in the 1990s based on two Input-Output tables of 1992 and 1997 which 
allow to measure the provincial absorption and to distinguish between international trade of prov-
inces and their domestic trade with the ‘rest of China’. In that period, a relative decrease of the 
domestic trade volume is an established fact. Poncet use endogenous trade policy as a methodo-
logical framework to explain this observation. One central component is the estimation of border 
effects between Chinese provinces. Facing the lack of bilateral trade data, this has to be done by 
considering average distances to all other provinces for every province. This is only one example 
that shows that in this sort of research a lot of effort has to be spent on processing data in order to 
make them compatible with the methodology. Since alternatives are rarely available, there is no 
way to check the robustness of those procedures relative to the benchmark of using the most ap-
propriate data.  
Based on her painstaking work, Poncet reaches the conclusion that border effects became stronger 
between 1992 and 1997 and that they compare with cross-national border effects internationally. 
Her results receive additional support from the observation that for different industries and goods, 
different border effects match with the expectations (for example, border effects are particularly 
strong for agricultural goods). That is, the pattern of border effects corresponds with what we 
know about the preferences of local governments with regard to the support and protection of 
particular industries. This impression can be further supported by a direct estimation of an en-
dogenous policy model. So, Poncet can show that labour intensity and fiscal contribution are a 
determinant of the level of protection granted to an industry. The idea behind this is that local 
governments wish to avoid unemployment and aim at maximizing tax revenue. 
We have discussed Poncet’s work in some more detail because it is certainly state of the art. 
However, the limitations are also evident. Firstly, as it came out from Poncet’s own work on busi-
ness cycles that we mentioned previously, the observation period might be simply special (in both 
years, for instance, with regard to the macroeconomic environment, whereas the business cycle 
research covers many more years). We cannot extrapolate these results to the new millennium. 
Secondly, the concept of border effects depends on many assumptions. One that deserves special 
attention is the notion of distance, which is treated as a proxy of trade costs. This is by no means 
evident, because trade costs include all sorts of transaction costs (for a survey of the literature, see 
Anderson and van Wincoop 2004). There are reasons to believe that transaction costs are not ho-
mogenous and correlate linearly with distance in China. Thirdly, there are also economic reasons 
why provinces might show an increasing inward orientation during the current stage of develop-
ment in China. State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
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The last point relates with the general observation that more advanced methodologies are also 
higher loaded with theoretical assumptions. One relevant assumption is the possibility of increas-
ing returns to scale. In a scenario with institutional change and increasing returns it can be the 
case that over a certain period transaction costs increase because of higher uncertainty of markets 
and business, and at the same time one can expect that consumer demand diversifies because of 
rapid innovation of new products. Both factors influence important parameters of the border effect 
estimation. Now, if strong economic growth opens up scope for local increasing returns to scale, a 
picture becomes plausible where over a certain period domestic absorption increases and is cov-
ered by increasingly efficient domestic production within a province.  
This is only one example for theoretical ambiguities. Ambiguities are especially strong also with 
reference to the political economy story of local protectionism. This is evident from one substan-
tial contribution, namely by Bai et al. (2004) and (2008). The argument has already been made by 
Naughton (2003) that there is no necessary and unequivocal connection between the profitability 
of local enterprises and protection. This is related to the hard budget constraint under which most 
local governments operate and the generally high importance of performance indicators for the 
career of their top officials. So they will at least be reluctant to protect inefficient enterprises that 
might be costly to support, whereas profitable enterprises might also export into other regions. 
This has to be seen together with the career patterns of local cadres. Here, again, the term ‘local’ 
is especially confusing, when it comes to local protectionism. There are reasons to believe that 
officials on lower levels of the hierarchy have stronger incentives to protect their turf, because 
they have few opportunities to move up. But on this level there are also relatively limited means 
of protectionism available. Higher up in the hierarchy, and especially on the provincial level, ca-
reer patterns are more diversified and not necessarily linked to the province where an official is 
currently located. In sum, the political economy story can offer plausible accounts both in favour 
and against local protectionism. 
So we end up with an argument that is partly circular. In the more sophisticated approaches to 
local protectionism, the alleged distortions are seen as evidence for government interference, be-
cause this interference as such cannot be proven directly. However, the distortions themselves are 
not directly observable, but depend on the theoretical framework, which includes certain assump-
tions about the incentives for local protectionism. These conceptual problems are reinforced by 
the observation that the different approaches that we have overviewed do by no means result into 
a clear-cut account of local protectionism in China. Overall, the case for it seems weak. State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
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3  Approaching ‘cellularity’ with spatial econometrics 
Considering the many difficulties of the local protectionism argument, we wish to introduce a new 
approach. With reference to China studies, we begin with neutralizing the hypothesis by substitut-
ing ‘local protectionism’ by ‘cellularity’ (Donnithorne 1972). The notion that China is a cellular 
economy has been coined for understanding the Maoist period, in particular. It refers to a mix of 
factors that contribute to a markedly inward orientation of spatial units in China. In the pre-reform 
period, this was mostly the effect of the planning system (Lyons 1985). In post-reform China, this 
might be the result of complex developmental factors and institutional changes which include 
devolution of administrative tasks from the center to the regions. This is not the place to consider 
this complicated story, which has been translated into a number of specific models of the Chinese 
(political) economy, such as the regional property rights model (Herrmann-Pillath 1994, extend-
ing on Granick 1990) on the quasi-federalism model (Qian and Weingast 1996). By using the term 
‘cellularity’ we avoid any pre-commitment to the idea that inward orientation is the result of de-
liberate policies, because it can also result from a confluence of a manifold of determinants. 
So we think that we need a methodology that can target this phenomenon as close as possible. 
This is the methodology of spatial econometrics (for a survey, see Abreu et al. 2005). Spatial 
econometrics is mainly used for the analysis of growth, but is also increasingly applied in the 
analysis of spatial effects in policies of compound governments, such as federations (for a survey, 
see Brueckner 2003).  
The idea is simple, but powerful. Firstly, space matters. In the analysis of growth, space matters, 
for example, because there are geographical determinants of development which have been ne-
glected for long. This, however, is a story of absolute location in space. Secondly, relative loca-
tion also matters, that is, the relative location of spatial units, such as simple neighbourhood or 
distance. This aspect is clearly important to understand all sorts of diffusion processes in growth, 
such as the diffusion of technologies. Diffusion processes, at a closer look, include the possibility 
of feedback mechanisms, which stay at the centre of spatial econometrics. That is, for instance, if 
a technology diffuses across spatial units, there are also feedbacks on the use of the technology in 
the originating units. The same applies for growth: If growth spills over from one unit to the other, 
increasing growth in the latter will spill over back to the originating unit. The important insight is 
that econometric estimations of convergence of growth that do not include this endogeneity will 
present a distorted view on the determinants of growth. 
So far, this is also the research question that has been pursued with reference to China (e.g. Ying 
2003; Sandberg 2004). Standard convergence analysis neglected those spatial interdependences, 
and thus might end up with overestimating factors such as FDI or the role of TVEs. Spatial State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
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econometrics can therefore present a more exact view on issues such as whether China divides 
into different ‘convergence clubs’.  
In our context, we see another application of spatial econometrics. This is to define another meas-
ure of market integration. Without strong theoretical assumptions, spatial econometrics allows to 
directly identify the strength of spatial dependences across spatial units. We regard this as the 
most straightforward indicator of the ‘cellularity’ of spatial units in the Chinese economy. Since 
we are not interested into the more complex questions such as how to determine growth determi-
nants, we can also rely on two different approaches to measuring spatial interdependence. In spa-
tial econometrics, spatial interdependence as such is measured by the Moran’s I test, which al-
ready suffices to identify interactions on the global and the local level by means of purely descrip-
tive statistics. The econometric estimation of growth can further support the results of this test and 
can distinguish between growth factors and the role of interdependences, thus, according to our 
focus, identifying the role of the latter. 
The novelty of our approach mainly results from the unique data base that we use. So far, all the 
research on market integration in China uses the province as a basic spatial unit. This is legiti-
mate, but one certainly needs to consider the simple fact that Chinese provinces are of the size of 
an average European nation, which is, as we have seen, a fact that counts, for example, in assess-
ing the increasing returns argument. Therefore, it seems advisable to deepen our understanding of 
spatial dependences in moving one level down, which is the level of the prefecture. Our data bases 
are the digitalized data that are published biannually in the “China Urban Statistical Yearbook” by 
the National Bureau of Statistics, Department for Urban Statistics. This is part of a decade long 
cooperation with the NBS and the China Economic Information Network, in which prefecture 
level  data  have  been  used  to  analyse  regional  disparities  in  China  (Herrmann-Pillath  et  al., 
2002a,b, 2006; for a more detailed discussion of prefecture level data, see the first article). 
The prefecture (diqu) always was a sort of regional branch of the provincial government, thus 
having very few independent administrative functions, although it always was a unit in economic 
statistics. A prefecture includes both urban areas and counties. During the reforms, this system 
underwent many changes which were mainly pushed by the urbanization process (overview in 
Chung and Lam 2004). Increasingly, larger cities fused with surrounding rural areas, and further-
more, administrative upgrading in the territorial hierarchy also would improve access for many 
resources. As a result, the system gradually changed into a state were ‘prefecture level cities’ (diji 
shi) also obtained a more important role in administrative and policy terms. Beginning in 2002, 
this was also reflected in the statistics, which from now on did no longer list ‘prefectures’, but 
instead cities with the status of a prefecture, and distinguishes between the ‘entire city’ (quan shi) State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
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and the ‘urban districts’ (shi xia qu). Generally speaking, there is a relatively close continuity be-
tween the prefectures and the prefecture level cities. There have been more changes in the compo-
sition of the prefecture level units, because often rural counties have been merged with the city 
proper, so changing from ‘county’ into ‘urban district’. This boosts the size of the ‘city’ as com-
pared to the ‘prefecture’, and might even end up with the identity of the ‘shi’ and the former 
‘diqu’.  
In our context, as we consider a more recent and limited period, the prefecture or prefecture level 
city is a relatively stable unit in the spatial statistics, especially with reference to the provincial 
borders. Therefore, the many administrative changes below that level do not affect our argument. 
However, there are exceptions for this general rule. Unfortunately, we were forced to drop 36 
prefectures, where “administrative change” was reported, since the variables for these prefectures 
are not compatible over time. This omission is not entirely harmless, since it can cause a selection 
bias: these prefectures had gross regional product significantly below average. On the other hand, 
most of these prefectures are clustered in particular provinces, so that the impact of omission on 
spatial spillovers, as measured in this paper may be not so large. Anyway, this issue calls for cau-
tion in the interpretation of our results. Moreover, as it is usual in growth regressions, given a 
relatively short period of our sample, we estimate a cross-section and take the averages of all de-
pendent and independent variables to avoid potential impact of short-term business cycle fluctua-
tions on our results. 
The basic idea of our approach is the following. If we distinguish between the provincial level and 
the prefectural level, we can distinguish between different patterns of spatial dependence. Growth 
in a prefecture can be influenced by a neighbouring prefecture. Some neighbours, however, be-
long to another province, so that a part of the border is a provincial border. So we can check for 
different border effects on spatial interdependence: We can look at the entire set of prefectures 
and measure interdependence, or we can look at intra-provincial borders only, or cross-provincial 
borders only. This allows identifying different border effects without the help of a theoretical 
model of spatial dependences: We just compare relative effects on different levels of the spatial 
hierarchy. We consider this as the major methodological advantage of our approach to all others 
that we have reported in section 2: We operate with a minimum of theoretical presumptions, and 
we do not need external comparisons, as we extract our benchmark from the Chinese setting, just 
comparing different sets of prefectures which also are located in geographical proximity, but dif-
fer only in the feature of sharing a provincial border or not. 
We have four combinations of the features of dependence and internal/external which can be 
combined in different ways. State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
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Table 1: Patterns of spatial dependence 
  dependence  no dependence 
Within province  1  2 
Across province  3  4 
 
−  1 plus 3: If there are spatial dependences between prefectures both within and across 
provincial borders, this is evidence in favour of market integration and against cellular-
ity on the provincial level. 
−  2 plus 4: spatial dependences may be absent both within and between provinces. This 
would be a very strong support for the ‘cellular economy’ hypothesis even on the pre-
fectural level.   
−  1 plus 4: In this case there are spatial dependences between prefectures, if they are lo-
cated in the same province. At the same time, there are no dependences across provin-
cial borders. This would support the ‘cellular’ hypothesis on the provincial level. 
−  2 plus 3: This case would possibly correspond to a scheme in which there is a strong 
command economy on the national level which supports integration on the provincial 
level, but a ‘cellular’ structure on the level below the province. This could be a plausi-
ble interpretation of the Maoist time, but would probably be caused by data problems 
today, because it seems highly contradictory to the established fact of market liberali-
zation. 
Now, a central piece in the spatial econometrics approach is the matrix W that fixes the spatial 
structure. There are different possibilities here, such as considering the distances between a single 
prefecture and all other prefectures, which would be reasonable approach if we were interested in 
the diffusion of growth. As our main interest focuses on the identification of border effects, we 
can do with a much simpler neighbourhood matrix. In this quadratic matrix of the prefectures, we 
assign “1” to the case that two prefectures share a border and “0” if not. We then construct two 
other variants of the W matrix. In the second variant we assign “1” only to borders between pre-
fectures, which do not coincide with provincial borders – and therefore measure only “internal” 
spatial dependences within provinces. In the third variant “1” is assigned only to borders between 
prefectures, which coincide with provincial borders in order to measure the “external” depend-
ences between provinces. As it is necessary in the spatial regressions, we had to exclude all pre-State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
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fectures, which have no neighbours (or where all neighbours have been excluded because of miss-
ing data or administrative change).  
Unfortunately, it also means that the sample used to estimate internal, external and total spillovers 
is different; for example, for external spillovers all prefectures have to be dropped, which have no 
borders with prefectures outside the province. Thus, we use 234 prefectures to estimate total spill-
overs,  223  prefectures  for  internal  spillovers  and  138  prefectures  for  external  spillovers.  For 
Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin and Chongqing we treat the borders of the cities as provincial borders. 
For the island prefectures (on Hainan) we also take the “sea borders” to the closest continental 
prefecture (as it is specified in the Chinese administrative system). 
 
4  The spatial econometrics evidence on ‘cellularity’ of the Chinese economy 
We will now report the main results of our spatial econometrics exercises. We will begin with the 
standard Moran’s I test which checks for spatial dependences in the descriptive statistics. We will 
then present two results on growth spillovers: one for the prefectures, and another for the urban 
areas in the prefectures. Finally, we consider the growth spillovers of public expenditures across 
prefectures. Our results are robust, reliable and precise: China appears to be a country that con-
sists of relatively insulated provincial economies. 
4.1  Results of Moran’s I test 
We apply the descriptive statistics from the spatial analysis and concentrate on the local Moran’s 
I’s, which indicate whether growth rates of a particular jurisdiction are positively or negatively 
influenced by the growth rates of the neighbouring territories.  
To start with, we compute the “global” Moran’s I’s, which, as the Table 2 shows, are highly sig-
nificant and positive in for the whole sample and the sample with “internal” borders, and not sig-
nificant (and negative) for the sample of cross-provincial “external” borders. This is the most 
simple and straightforward evidence that provincial borders matter.  State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
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Table 2: Global Moran’s I 
Specification  (1)  (5)  (9)  (13)  (17)  (21)  (30)  (36)  (43) 
Moran’s I  3.982***  5.123***  -1.874  2.391**  2.484**  -0.159  3.877***  4.676***  -1.856 
 
Note: Moran’s I is calculated for particular specifications of regressions from Tables 3-7 with numbers corresponding 
to the numbers in these tables, The term “specification” refers to the set of control variables and sample of observa-
tions. 
Specifications (1), (13) and (30): all borders 
Specifications (5), (17) and (36): only internal borders 
Specifications (9), (21) and (43): only external borders 
In the next step, we “decompose” these indicators, looking at the local Moran’s I’s for each of the 
prefectures of the total sample. Table A1 (appendix) summarizes the local Moran’s I’s for all pre-
fectures in the sample, sorting them according to the size of the z-values. Although using p-values 
for inference for local spatial autocorrelation is problematic (Sokal et al., 1998), for simplicity we 
concentrate our analysis on prefectures with significant Moran’s I’s. This sample includes 39 pre-
fectures, specifically five with negative Moran’s I’s (i.e. where growth is negatively correlated to 
the growth in the neighbouring jurisdictions), and the rest with positive Moran’s I’s (as it could be 
expected, this is a majority, since the global Moran’s I is also positive).  State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
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In what follows we consider the borders between these 39 prefectures. First, we allocate them 
according to three groups we have used so far: only internal borders, internal and external borders 
and only external borders. One can see that about two third of the prefectures have both external 
and internal borders, while one third has only borders within provinces. Second, we look at the 
group with internal and external borders (24 prefectures) and locate them on the map of China. 
Our main idea is to find out all pairs of prefectures, where both jurisdictions exhibit significant 
Moran’I, share a common border and are located in different provinces. The more of these pairs 
are there, the more problematic our results are. However, in the whole sample of 234 prefectures 
we find only 8 (!) where this is the case: Shizuishan (Ningxia Province) and Wuhai (Neimenggu 
Province),  Zhangzhou  (Fujian  Province)  and  Chaozhou  (Guangdong  Province),  Hohhot 
(Neimenggu Province) and Shuozhou (Shanxi Province), Yulin (Shanxi Province) and Wuzhong 
(Ningxia Province). Moreover, not a single prefecture of the list has to “external” neighbours with 
significant spillovers. All 24 regions are marked on Map 1. State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
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We consider this result a cautious confirmation of our main claim: cross-provincial spatial de-
pendences seem to be rather exceptions than rule in China. We do however urge for caution: first, 
because of the purely statistical reasons (indicated above), and second, since these pairs measure 
only the “bilateral” interdependence: it is possible, however, that the large and wealthy centre 
influences the growth in the surrounding prefectures, while these territories are too small to matter 
for  the  metropolitan  region  (Shanghai  is  probably  the  most  obvious  example).  There  is  no 
straightforward statistical way to solve this problem: however, we address it partially by looking 
at the spillovers in the Yangzi River Delta and Pearl River Delta. These two regions are also inter-
esting from the general point of view, since it is often claimed that the degree of cooperation 
achieved there is higher than in China in general, but, as we have seen in section 2, some results 
of related research shows that the degree of integration might be less than expected. Indeed, not a 
single prefecture of the list of 39 significant spatial spillovers is located in the Yangtse River 
Delta (Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zheijang Provinces); 7 are in the Pearl River Delta (Guangdong 
Province), but of these 7 only 2 share borders with other provinces, 5 are purely internal. Gener-
ally speaking, Map 1 also does not indicate strong clustering of the regions with cross-border de-
pendences in the rich eastern part of the country. In fact, 6 of 24 are located in the Hubei province. 
Map 1 is also interesting in terms of the Moran scatterplot (Figure 1). Roughly speaking, the 
Moran scatterplot regresses the economic performance of the regions on the economic perform-
ance of their neighbours (to be more precise, it compares the z-values with the product of z and 
the weighting matrix W). One can see that the overall mass of the prefectures is concentrated in 
the “high-high” and “low-low” segments of the diagram (which indicate positive correlation). The 
most obvious outlier from this perspective is Wuzhong, which demonstrates very low growth as 
opposed to the neighbourhood and is in “low-high” segment. But what is particularly important, 
we can also find a number of outliers in the “high-high” segment, with very high own growth and 
growth of the neighbourhood. One can see that of four pairs of the prefectures with significant 
cross-provincial dependences described above three include these outliers. So, one possible inter-
pretation can be that in case of particularly good economic performance one observes positive 
effects across provincial borders, which cannot be “tamed” even by the forces of cellularity. If the 
performance  is  more  moderate,  cellularity  becomes  strong  enough  to  prevent  spillovers  from 
emerging.  
 State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
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To conclude, we believe that the analysis of local spatial autocorrelation provides initial support 
for the ‘cellularity’ hypothesis. We can provide further evidence by means of analyzing growth 
spillovers across Chinese prefectures. 
4.2  Growth spillovers across Chinese prefectures: Provincial borders matter 
We will now look for the presence of the growth spillovers between individual jurisdictions. In a 
highly cellular economy these spillovers should be very weak, i.e. growth in one jurisdiction 
should not influence the performance of the neighbouring jurisdiction. There are different chan-
nels through which spillovers can happen, among others: 
−  Linkages via trade and investment 
−  Imitation of policies and technologies State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
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−  Migration and knowledge diffusion 
−  Demand pull. 
This list shows that normally we can expect spillovers, such as in the interesting case of Russia, 
which is also a large country with many regional subunits (Boccatello 2007).  
Empirically, we apply the tools of the spatial econometrics to find out the possible spillovers. Par-
ticularly, we estimate the following regression 
 
 
where sub-index i  indicates a particular prefecture, GROWTH indicates the growth rate, N
j is the 
set of all prefectures where j≠i, while wij comes from the weighting matrix W describing the 
“neighborhood” of prefectures. In particular, we use the most obvious matrix, where all entries for 
prefectures sharing common borders are set to be equal to “1”, and all other entries are “0”. The 
term ρ describes the spatial spillovers: if it is significant and positive, growth in neighbouring 
prefectures increases growth in the prefecture; if it is negative vice versa, if it is insignificant, no 
spatial spillovers can be established. The estimation of this regression is likely to be subject to the 
problem of endogeneity, hence we apply the ML-estimator as described by Anselin (1988) to cope 
with this issue. In addition, we have to separate between a spatial lag model as described above 
and  a  spatial  error  model,  where  spatial  correlation  is  present  in  the  error  term,  i.e. 
. In this case in order to obtain predictions for the spatial spillovers one has to es-
timate the λ, which measures the spatial spillovers in the error term. For the purpose of robustness 
we estimate both spatial lag and spatial error model, although the results never change. 
We include the following control variables in all regressions: GRP in the year 2000 (“initial level 
of the gross regional product”), total investments in fixed assets, share of medical doctors in the 
population (to evaluate the quality of the health system), share of students in the secondary educa-
tion system in the population (to evaluate the quality of the educational system) and population 
growth rate. Both GRP and population growth rates are calculated as GRP (population) of the year 
t divided over the GRP (population) of the year t-1. GRP is corrected for inflation using provin-
cial-level CPI. It seems obvious that several covariates may also be subject to endogeneity. For 
example, investments, health and medical systems may be in fact strongly influenced by the eco-
nomic growth. Even the population growth may be subject to reverse causality if migration is 
taken into account (but also indirectly – if fertility rates are influenced by human well-being).  State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
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Hence, we face the problem of endogenous controls, which can as well bias the estimation of the 
spatial effect. Since it is not the primarily objective of this paper to establish the influence of the 
control variables on the economic growth, we use a “shortcut”: estimate an additional specifica-
tion where all controls are excluded and look at the results in terms of growth spillovers; then only 
robust results are interpreted (note that the estimations of λ and ρ in these models are expected to 
coincide). Summary statistics and additional information for all variables are provided in Table 
A2, appendix. 
The main results are reported in Table 3, which shows the different estimations for the cases that 
we distinguished previously, i.e. including all prefectures, prefectures with internal borders only, 
and prefectures with external borders. Equations (1) – (4) report the spatial spillovers for different 
models and specifications, if all borders between prefectures are taken into account. We find a 
strong and robust positive spillover for both spatial lag and spatial error models, as well as exclu-
sion and inclusion of endogenous controls. In the same way, regressions (5) – (8) report the re-
sults, when only internal borders are taken into account. In this case the positive spillovers are 
also present. Basically, we find that for these regressions growth in a prefecture is causing posi-
tive effects on the growth in the neighbouring jurisdictions.  
The situation changes dramatically if one looks at the regressions (9) - (12), where only external 
borders (i.e. borders between provinces) are taken into account. For three of four regressions we 
find no spillovers, in one case spillovers are negative and marginally (10%) significant. So, it is 
reasonable to conclude that we find ourselves in the situation with strong internal spillovers, but 
no external spillovers, which, as mentioned above, is indicative specifically for the case of the 
provincial protectionism. 
There is a number of further interesting observations to be discussed from the results of Table 3. 
As it is commonly the case, we find negative and significant impact of the initial GRP on the 
growth rates, suggesting that poorer prefectures experience faster growth. Our timeframe is cer-
tainly too short to establish the conditional β-convergence result, but it is still providing some 
evidence in this direction. We also find positive and significant impact of investments and health-
care system on the growth rates of the GRP; for the total sample and sample with internal spill-
overs there is also positive and significant impact of the population growth and education on the 
growth rates of the GRP (although the latter are only marginally significant). These results are 
consistent with the common predictions for the economic growth models; however, as mentioned, 
due to the reverse causality problem they should rather be interpreted as correlations than as 
causal links. State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
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Table  3:  Spatial  spillovers  for  prefectures,  dep.  var.:  average  GRP  growth  rate  (inflation-
corrected), 2001-2007 









































Initial GRP  -0.000***  -0.000***      -0.000***  -0.000***      -0.000***  -0.000***     
  (0.000)  (0.000)      (0.000)  (0.000)      (0.000)  (0.000)     
Population 
growth 
0.346***  0.317***      0.304***  0.259**      0.147  0.029     
  (0.100)  (0.111)      (0.115)  (0.126)      (0.232)  (0.230)     
Investments  0.000***  0.000***      0.000***  0.000***      0.000***  0.000***     
  (0.000)  (0.000)      (0.000)  (0.000)      (0.000)  (0.000)     
Education  0.437*  0.496*      0.462**  0.471**      0.322  0.470     
  (0.247)  (0.275)      (0.213)  (0.218)      (0.471)  (0.422)     
Healthcare  0.001***  0.001***      0.001***  0.001***      0.002***  0.003***     
  (0.000)  (0.000)      (0.000)  (0.000)      (0.001)  (0.001)     
Constant  0.328**  0.766***  0.620***  1.135***  0.347**  0.826***  0.572***  1.134***  0.991***  1.035***  1.131***  1.130*** 
  (0.128)  (0.115)  (0.103)  (0.005)  (0.149)  (0.128)  (0.080)  (0.005)  (0.259)  (0.215)  (0.109)  (0.004) 
ρ  0.366***    0.454***    0.385***    0.496***    -0.050    -0.000   
  (0.087)    (0.091)    (0.078)    (0.071)    (0.086)    (0.096)   
λ    0.339***    0.454***    0.387***    0.496***    -0.214*    -0.000 
    (0.110)    (0.091)    (0.103)    (0.071)    (0.116)    (0.096) 
External 
borders 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Internal 
borders 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Observations  234  234  234  234  223  223  223  223  138  138  138  138 
Variance 
ratio 
0.426  0.274  0.093  0.000  0.473  0.257  0.146  0.000  0.346  0.396  0.000  0.000 
LM test ρ=0  30.045***    43.674***    39.565***    61.818***    0.449    0.000   
LM test λ=0    13.778***    43.674***    23.580***    61.818***    4.000**    0.000 
Notes: numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. * 10% significance, ** 5% significance, *** 1% signifi-
cance. Significant results are marked bold 
 
Now, in addition to the main model, we re-estimate all regressions using just the data for the pre-
fectural capital instead of the whole prefecture. Given a very strong difference between the city 
and the countryside in China, it could be reasonable to exclude the impact of the rural area, since 
spillovers can be limited just to the cities and urban population. Table 4 reports the results of this 
specification. Basically, it confirms the results of the previous regressions. We find positive spill-
overs both for the whole sample and within provincial borders (although their significance level is 
lower than in case of the Table 3), which survive all specifications and omission of endogenous 
controls. For the spillovers across provincial borders, if controls are included, both λ and ρ are State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
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insignificant; after exclusion of controls they become significant, but LM-test cannot reject the 
null hypothesis (absence of spatial correlation). As for controls, we still find a negative correlation 
between  the  initial  GRP  and  GRP  growth  and  a  positive  correlation  between  the  population 
growth and the GRP growth (which is now present in all three samples) and the total investments 
and the GRP growth. Education and healthcare do not demonstrate any significant correlation 
with growth, probably indicating a much higher quality of public services in cities, when simple 
improvements in the number of doctors and secondary education pupils does not have any impact 
on growth any more.  
Table 4: Spatial spillovers for Chinese prefectural capitals, dep. var.: average GRP growth rate 
(inflation-corrected), 2001-2007 
  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19)  (20)  (21)  (22)  (23)  (24) 
Initial GRP  -0.000***  -0.000***      -0.000***  -0.000***      -0.000***  -0.000***     
  (0.000)  (0.000)      (0.000)  (0.000)      (0.000)  (0.000)     
Population 
growth 
0.554***  0.560***      0.532***  0.542***      0.514***  0.516***     
  (0.105)  (0.104)      (0.100)  (0.099)      (0.087)  (0.087)     
Investments  0.000***  0.000***      0.000***  0.000***      0.000***  0.000***     
  (0.000)  (0.000)      (0.000)  (0.000)      (0.000)  (0.000)     
Education  0.376  0.417      0.428  0.459      0.209  0.219     
  (0.286)  (0.291)      (0.288)  (0.294)      (0.290)  (0.292)     
Healthcare  0.000  0.000      -0.000  -0.000      0.000  0.000     
  (0.000)  (0.000)      (0.000)  (0.000)      (0.000)  (0.000)     
Constant  0.402***  0.540***  0.937***  1.162***  0.439***  0.557***  0.921***  1.161***  0.651***  0.599***  1.283***  1.153*** 
  (0.115)  (0.110)  (0.081)  (0.007)  (0.101)  (0.105)  (0.076)  (0.007)  (0.105)  (0.085)  (0.072)  (0.005) 
ρ  0.127*    0.193***    0.113*    0.207***    -0.042    -0.112*   
  (0.066)    (0.069)    (0.061)    (0.064)    (0047)    (0.062)   
λ    0.189**    0.193***    0.169**    0.207***    -0.023    -0.112* 
    (0.085)    (0.069)    (0.077)    (0.064)    (0.096)    (0.062) 
External 
borders 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Internal 
borders 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Observations  234  234  234  234  223  223  223  223  138  138  138  138 
Variance 
ratio 
0.648  0.635  0.013  0.000  0.664  0.650  0.021  0.000  0.566  0.562  0.024  0.000 
LM test ρ=0  4.749**    5.929**    5.363**    9.144***    0.467    2.057   
LM test λ=0    4.869**    5.929**    5.327**    9.144***    0.063    2/057 
 
Notes: see Table 3 
We can now draw our first conclusion: The spatial econometrics of growth spillovers clearly leads 
to the same result as the descriptive statistics of Moran’s I test. The Chinese economy manifests a 
stark difference in the degrees of integration within provinces and across provinces. In other State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
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words, the possible channels of growth diffusion are blocked by provincial borders. The Chinese 
economy is ‘cellular’. However, this observation does not necessarily imply that the blockade is 
erected by provincial governments intentionally, as the suspicion of ‘local protectionism’ sug-
gests. Therefore, we turn to one possible approach to identify local protectionism directly.  
4.3  Prefecture-level public expenditures: Targeting the local economy 
We now look at one particular channel of the growth spillovers, which can exist in across Chinese 
prefectures: the effect of public expenditures of the prefectural budgets on the growth rates in the 
neighbouring provinces. Basically, we look at possible spillovers of public activity implemented 
at the prefectural level (for example, public goods) on the performance of neighbouring prefec-
tures. Since expenditures are done by the prefectures, and not by provinces and the central gov-
ernment, their main focus is obviously on the economic performance of the own prefecture; how-
ever, given sufficient market integration and interregional mobility, these expenditures have to 
impact also the neighbouring territories (although the direction of impact can be different, repre-
senting both positive expenditure spillovers or, possibly expenditure competition across jurisdic-
tions – in this case the sign should be negative). However, if mobility and market integration are 
restricted across provincial borders, no spillover should be present. Thus, we confirm the exis-
tence of the provincial protectionism, as above, if there are spillovers of public expenditures 
within provinces, but not across provincial borders. 
Technically, we use the following approach: we estimate a simple OLS regression for the growth 
rate, where we add two additional control variables (among other mentioned above). First, we add 
the own expenditures of the prefecture; it is possible that own expenditures and expenditures of 
the neighbours are correlated, for example, if there is any clustering of regions according to their 
level of development and economic policy (what is not unlikely for China), and therefore this 
variable is necessary for our analysis. Second, we also add the neighbouring expenditures: sum of 
expenditures of all neighbouring  prefectures. We use three definitions of the “neighbouring pre-
fectures” for three specifications: first, we consider as “neighbours” all prefectures, which share 
common borders with a particular prefecture, then we exclude prefectures from other provinces 
(“neighbouring  internal expenditures”), and then we exclude prefectures from the own province 
(“neighbouring external expenditures”) to once again obtain an estimate of the spillovers within 
and across provincial borders. It should be noted that in this case the endogeneity problem is acute 
for  own  expenditures,  although  probably  less  pronounced  (but  also  not  to  be  excluded)  for 
neighbouring expenditures – so, our results should be interpreted as correlations rather than causal 
links. Finally, we also estimate spatial models with own and external expenditures as described State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
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above to see whether the results survive this approach and whether the neighbouring expenditures 
capture all the external effects across the borders of the prefectures.  
Table 5 reports the results for the whole sample, when both intra-provincial borders and borders 
between provinces are taken into account. Regression (25) simply reports the growth equation; 
(26) adds the domestic expenditures; (27) includes just the neighbouring expenditures; and (28) 
controls for both domestic and neighbouring expenditures simultaneously. The results are interest-
ing: we find a positive spillover from the neighborhood expenditures, but no impact of the domes-
tic expenditures on the own growth rates. This result, however, crucially depends on the presence 
of Beijing in the sample, as it will be discussed in what follows. For all OLS regressions we im-
plement two types of outlier control. First, we check the distribution of residuals, and if the nor-
mal distribution is rejected by the Jarque-Bera test, exclude outliers with large residuals as long as 
the test remains significant. Then only robust results are interpreted. This approach, however, 
does not yield any changes in terms of sign and significance of the own and neighbouring expen-
ditures. Second, we also look at prefectures with particularly large values of expenditures, but 
small residuals, which could thus turn the slope of the regression line. The most interesting candi-
date in this context is Beijing. After exclusion of the Chinese capital city (regression (29)) both 
domestic and neighbouring expenditures provide positive and significant impact. The explanation 
for this result is straightforward: the expenditures of Beijing are too high for its growth rates, 
probably, because of the capital city status and functions implemented.
1 Regression (30) and (31) 
re-estimate the regression (28) using spatial lag and spatial error models. In both cases the expen-
diture spillover effect disappears, but ρ and λ are highly significant and positive once again. This 
is, on the one hand, a reason to be more cautious with the interpretation of our results with respect 
to the expenditures, but also an indication that the expenditure spillovers do not exhaust all spill-
overs between the Chinese prefectures.
2 
                                                   
1 Yet another outlier according to the total size of expenditures seems to be Dongguan; its exclusion from regression 
(29) does not change the results. 
2 In addition, one should notice that the expenditure spillovers found within a province are statistically significant, but 
economically relatively small, as well as the effect of the own expenditures on growth. Basically, increasing expen-
ditures in the own jurisdiction by 10 bln. RMB (about 1 bln. EUR) in regression (29) increases the growth rates by 
1.7 percent points (given the measurement units for the growth rates), what is relatively low. As for the spillovers, 
increase of spending in the neighboring prefectures by 10 bln. RMB increases growth by about 0.2 percent points. 
Given the real expenditures of Chinese prefectures (which on average made out 3 bln. RMB annually during the pe-
riod of observation), even doubling public expenditures will just generate about 0.5 percent points of the economic 
growth – while the average annual growth rates during the period were about 13%.  State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 137  27 
 
Table  5:  Expenditure  spillovers  for  Chinese  prefectures,  both  intra-provincial  and  provincial 
borders, dep. var.: average GRP growth rate (inflation-corrected), 2001-2007 
  (25)  (26)  (27)  (28)  (29)  (30)  (31) 
Initial GRP  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Population growth  0.326***  0.326***  0.318***  0.317***  0.296***  0.341***  0.313*** 
  (0.106)  (0.106)  (0.098)  (0.099)  (0.098)  (0.098)  (0.106) 
Investments  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Education  0.556**  0.556**  0.575**  0.575**  0.600**  0.447*  0.500* 
  (0.274)  (0.274)  (0.274)  (0.275)  (0.273)  (0.247)  (0.274) 
Healthcare  0.002***  0.002***  0.002***  0.002***  0.002***  0.001***  0.001*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Own expenditures    0.002    0.004  0.017**  0.003  0.007 
    (0.011)    (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Neighbouring    expendi-
tures 
    0.002*  0.003*  0.003**  0.001  0.002 
      (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Constant  0.745***  0.746***  0.749***  0.750***  0.770***  0.338***  0.767*** 
  (0.104)  (0.105)  (0.097)  (0.097)  (0.096)  (0.130)  (0.110) 
ρ            0.359***   
            (0.090)   
λ              0.329*** 
              (0.113) 
Internal borders  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
External borders  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Beijing  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Observations  234  234  234  234  233  234  234 
R
2  0.374  0.375  0.380  0.381  0.401     
J.-B. test  122.2***  121.0***  140.9***  138.6***  124.5***     
Variance ratio            0.428  0.284 
LM test ρ=0            28.004***   
LM test λ=0              12.802*** 
Note: see Table 3. Outliers (Jarque-Bera test) are Yulin
3 and Yan’an in regressions (25)-(29). After exclusion of out-
liers education in regressions (25)-(28) becomes insignificant, but still has the same sign. Signs and significance of 
other variables do not change 
 
                                                   
3 We refer in all tables to the Yulin prefecture in the Shanxi province (榆林市); hence both outlier prefectures are in 
the northern part of China in Shanxi, and also share a common border. Hence, the outliers are somewhat consistent, 
making our estimation approach more convincing. State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
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Table 6: Expenditure spillovers for Chinese prefectures, provincial borders excluded, dep. var.: 
average GRP growth rate (inflation-corrected), 2001-2007 
  (32)  (33)  (34)  (35)  (36)  (37) 
Initial GRP  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Population growth  0.311***  0.289***  0.283***  0.254***  0.265***  0.251** 
  (0.105)  (0.101)  (0.090)  (0.081)  (0.102)  (0.105) 
Investments  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Education  0.576**  0.505*  0.601**  0.528*  0.427**  0.405* 
  (0.274)  (0.272)  (0.273)  (0.270)  (0.216)  (0.223) 
Healthcare  0.002***  0.001**  0.002***  0.001**  0.001  0.001 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Own expenditures    0.059**    0.065**  0.050**  0.055** 
    (0.027)    (0.028)  (0.024)  (0.023) 
Neighbouring    internal      0.006*  0.007**  0.004  0.006* 
      (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Constant  0.760***  0.794***  0.781***  0.823***  0.414***  0.838*** 
  (0.104)  (0.100)  (0.088)  (0.080)  (0.141)  (0.106) 
ρ          0.365***   
          (0.079)   
λ            0.356*** 
            (0.108) 
Internal borders  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
External borders  No  No  No  No  No  No 
Observations  223  223  223  223  223  223 
R
2  0.401  0.422  0.41  0.434     
J.-B. test  129.8***  104.0***  153.1***  131.7***     
Variance ratio          0.496  0.302 
LM test ρ=0          36.210***   
LM test λ=0            19.146*** 
Note: see Table 3. Outliers (Jarque-Bera test) are Yulin and Yan’an in regressions (32)-(35). After exclusion of outliers 
education in regressions (32), (33), (35) becomes insignificant, but still holds its sign. 
 
In the Table 6 we re-estimate all equations, if only borders between provinces are taken into ac-
count. At this stage we use, for consistency, the sample identical to that applied for estimating 
growth spillovers within provinces in Table 4. Therefore we re-estimate all regressions, with the 
exception of that where Beijing is dropped (simply because Beijing is excluded from the sample, 
because all its borders coincide with the borders of provinces).
4 Our results are once again consis-
tent with what was reported previously. We find positive effects from the own expenditures in all 
                                                   
4 We checked for the exclusion of Dongguan in regression (35), and did not find any differences State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
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specifications (both OLS and spatial models), but also establish positive expenditure spillovers in 
all OLS specifications, as well as in the spatial error model. Thus, it indeed looks like expendi-
tures of prefectures do cause growth in the neighbouring prefectures, if they are in the same prov-
ince.  
Table 7: Expenditure spillovers for Chinese prefectures, only provincial borders, dep. var.: aver-
age GRP growth rate (inflation-corrected), 2001-2007 
  (38)  (39)  (40)  (41)  (42)  (43)  (44) 
Initial GRP  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Population growth  0.177  0.177  0.182  0.181  0.154  0.143  0.034 
  (0.237)  (0.238)  (0.241)  (0.242)  (0.251)  (0.234)  (0.235) 
Investments  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Education  0.303  0.306  0.327  0.335  0.502  0.364  0.491 
  (0.468)  (0.474)  (0.470)  (0.478)  (0.472)  (0.479)  (0.426) 
Healthcare  0.002***  0.002***  0.002***  0.002***  0.002***  0.002***  0.003*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Own expenditures    0.002    0.005  0.021**  0.005  0.005 
    (0.015)    (0.015)  (0.010)  (0.014)  (0.016) 
Neighbouring    external       0.002  0.002  0.003  0.003  0.002 
      (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Constant  0.906***  0.907***  0.898***  0.899***  0.914***  1.006***  1.029*** 
  (0.235)  (0.236)  (0.239)  (0.240)  (0.250)  (0.262)  (0.220) 
ρ            -0.065   
            (0.087)   
λ              -0.211* 
              (0.116) 
Internal borders  No  No  No  No  No  No  No 
External borders  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Beijing  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Observations  138  138  138  138  137  138  138 
R
2  0.343  0.343  0.347  0.347  0.387     
J.-B. test  123.3***  121.9***  133.7***  131.0***  96.49***     
Variance ratio            0.350  0.391 
LM test ρ=0            0.732   
LM test λ=0              3.904** 
 
Note: see Table 3. Outlier (Jarque-Bera test) is Yulin in regressions (38) – (41). No changes after exclusion of outliers 
in terms of sign and significance are observed State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
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Finally, Table 7 reports the estimates for borders between prefectures, which coincide with the 
provincial borders. Once again, we take the sample consistent with that used for cross-provincial 
spillovers  in  Table  4.  In  this  case  we  find  no  spillover  effects  from  the  expenditures  of  the 
neighbouring jurisdictions regarding of the specification.  
We have stressed several times that we always used the sample consistent with the spatial models 
for growth spillovers discussed above. This approach has advantages (since we test the expendi-
ture and the growth spillovers in the same sample), but it is also necessary to look at expenditure 
spillovers in the full sample of 234 prefectures, since, unlike spatial models, OLS allows for in-
cluding regions without any neighbors. Table 8 provides respective estimates for spillovers within 
and across provincial borders (since estimates when all borders for this sample have already been 
reported in Table 5). We apply the variables of the neighbouring internal expenditures and the 
neighbouring external expenditures in the following way: if the prefecture has no borders, which 
coincide the provincial borders, we set neighbouring external expenditures to be zero, and if all 
borders coincide with provincial borders, neighbouring internal expenditures are set be zero. In 
the first four specifications we use just one of these two variables (each time, including and ex-
cluding Beijing); in the last two specifications both external and internal expenditures are present 
simultaneously (once again, with and without Beijing). The results confirm our expectations: we 
find a significant and positive spillover effect of the expenditures within provincial borders and no 
spillover effect across provincial borders, even if both variable are controlled for in the same re-
gression.
5 
To conclude, the empirical results seem to confirm our prediction of the provincial protectionism. 
However, the confirmation is not entirely robust, since we find also no significant internal spill-
overs for (some specifications of) the spatial models, but also especially because of the problem of 
endogeneity, which makes the reported results correlations rather than causal links. 
 
                                                   
5 The result is also reassuring, since it could indicate that the outcomes of the growth spillover analysis are not driven 
just by differences in the sample composition State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
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Table 8: Expenditure spillovers for Chinese prefectures, full sample, internal and external spill-
overs, dep. var.: average GRP growth rate (inflation-corrected), 2001-2007 
 
  (45)  (46)  (47)  (48)  (49)  (50) 
Initial GRP  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Population growth  0.297***  0.275***  0.328***  0.310***  0.299***  0.277*** 
  (0.092)  (0.091)  (0.107)  (0.108)  (0.093)  (0.091) 
Investments  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Education  0.569**  0.592**  0.562**  0.584**  0.576**  0.602** 
  (0.273)  (0.270)  (0.275)  (0.273)  (0.274)  (0.271) 
Healthcare  0.002***  0.002***  0.002***  0.002***  0.002***  0.002*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Own expenditures  0.007  0.020**  0.002  0.014*  0.007  0.021** 
  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.008)  (0.012)  (0.009) 
Neighbouring    internal   0.005*  0.006**      0.006*  0.006** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)      (0.003)  (0.003) 
Neighbouring    external       0.001  0.002  0.001  0.002 
      (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Constant  0.770***  0.791***  0.742***  0.759***  0.767***  0.787*** 
  (0.091)  (0.089)  (0.106)  (0.107)  (0.091)  (0.089) 
Beijing  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Observations  234  233  234  233  234  233 
R
2  0.383  0.403  0.375  0.394  0.384  0.405 
J.-B. test  139.9***  125.8***  125.2***  112.1***  145.1***  130.9*** 
 
Notes: see Table 3. Outliers are Yulin and Yan’an in all regressions. After the exclusion of outliers, education in re-
gression (45), (47), (48), (49) becomes insignificant, but maintains its sign; own expenditures in regression (48) be-
come insignificant, but maintain their sign. There are no further changes in terms of sign and significance. 
5  Conclusion: Why cellularity? 
Our results clearly establish the fact that provincial borders block economic spillovers. This also 
applies for spillovers of local public expenditures. Does that imply that we establish a case for 
local protectionism? 
In the case of local public expenditures, the most straightforward argument refers to the demand 
side: Prefectures might block external suppliers of goods and services and favour domestic sup-
pliers. In the many accounts of local protectionism, there is evidence on this, for sure. This does 
not only refer to investment, but maybe even more so for consumption. However, protectionism State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
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may be evident if a city favours local car producers for public transport, but less so if local beer is 
served at dinners, because the latter may indeed reflect a local preference. Other effects of local 
expenditures are less clear-cut. For example, investment into roads might favour internal trans-
port. But this argument seems short-sighted, because even in the protectionism story, local gov-
ernments would love local companies to export to other locations. After all, transport is a two-way 
process. Finally, there are many effects of public expenditures that are emphasized in the fiscal 
competition literature that cannot be stopped by protectionist measures of any kind. The most 
straightforward one is not yet considered in this paper and will be the object of a follow-up: This 
is that local expenditures may induce expenditures in other places, which in turn foster local 
growth. That is, expenditure competition can be an indirect mechanism of growth spillovers.  
This brief consideration shows that even in the case of local expenditures, the case for local pro-
tectionism is not as clear-cut as it seems on first sight. With regard to growth spillovers and spatial 
dependence in general, the story is even more opaque. One simple argument refers to the fact that 
local protectionism would not simply block spillovers, but might cause other spatial dependences. 
For example, if protectionism reduces exports of neighbouring provinces into the protectionist 
province, this would possibly cause reductions in growth that would feed back to the latter. Pro-
tectionism is not necessarily equal to spatial isolation, especially because it can only target par-
ticular industries or even companies. One can raise serious doubts whether local protectionist 
measures can accumulate such a strong force that aggregate macroeconomic effects on growth 
become visible. This simple argument might explain, why, as Holz (2009) demonstrates, the cen-
tral government shows concern about local protectionism, but does not make great fuss about it. 
Yet, our results are unequivocal: Chinese provinces are cellular units, viewed under the lense of 
spatial econometrics. We think that a cautious, but very interesting argument explaining this phe-
nomenon has to refer to a complex mix of determinants: 
Firstly, certainly we have to acknowledge the impact of administrative structure, with or without 
explicit protectionism. In the past 30 years, the legacy of the Chinese planning system has casted 
long shadows, which was designed as a matrix of vertical and horizontal structures (the so-called 
‘tiao-kuai’). The old system assigned a strong role to provinces in the allocation of many goods 
and services. Therefore, there is no need to assume a ‘master mind’ behind a large range of ad-
ministrative practices that insulate the provincial economies from each other. 
Secondly, this argument, however, does not explain why the effects are still strong even in the 
most developed and obviously liberalized provinces of China. This observation points towards a 
set of economic factors, which also have been ventilated in the literature in different contexts. One 
is the fact that over the past twenty years, the coastal provinces showed different patterns of ex-State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
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ternal integration into the world economy. The other is that the provinces also manifested mark-
edly divergent patterns of institutional change. Institutional change is interesting for two reasons. 
One is that different institutional contexts might favour certain economic interactions (e.g. public-
public and private-private, but less public-private), which can result into aggregate patterns. The 
other is that in the past, institutional change certainly increased the level of transaction costs. So, 
one reason for the insulation might be that there is a steep increase of transaction costs cross-
border. This is plausible if we consider the fact that business in China still heavily relies on gov-
ernment relations. Thus, for a businessman from Zhejiang province it might be much easier to do 
business within Zhejiang province that in neighbouring Jiangsu province.  
Thirdly, the point about transaction costs can be seen in the broader context of the sociocultural 
differences across Chinese provinces. Chinese business practice heavily relies on social networks. 
There are strong feelings of separate social identities, for example, separating Shanghainese busi-
nesspeople from non-Shanghainese. One factor contributing to these are dialectal differences, 
which are especially pronounced across the coastal provinces (language has been identified as a 
determinant of trade costs in international trade many times). Shanghainese cannot be understood 
by people from other provinces. If social networks are an important medium to cope with uncer-
tainty, then we can expect that there are strong border effects if provincial borders also reflect 
cultural borders. This is true for a substantial part of the coastal region (Guangdong,  Fujian, 
Shanghai etc.), but much less so for the central and northern regions. Cultural identities also go far 
beyond this role of linguistic differences and include many aspects of business behaviour, in par-
ticular. 
Fourthly, we have already mentioned that there is the possibility of an interaction between de-
mand diversification and economies of scale during rapid growth. For example, in the past decade 
there were many efforts at creating brands in China, including many local brands. Even without 
protectionism, such brands might meet consumer demand which might evolve a strong local pref-
erence, resulting into a growing, not diminishing home market effect. Strong growth of disposable 
income will support this and allows exploiting economies of scale on part of local producers. That 
is, sociocultural and economic effects might play together and produce an increasing ‘inward ori-
entiation’ of provincial economies. 
To summarize, we think that the results of the spatial econometrics can be most cautiously, but 
perhaps even best explained as the reflection of a set of social, political and economic forces that 
conjointly produce a pattern of ‘cellularity’ in the Chinese economy. In this pattern, local protec-
tionism plays a role, but cannot be assigned to the role of the dominant factor. From this we con-State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
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clude that great care should be applied when blaming politics for certain difficulties in market 
access in China.  
A final observation: One interesting aspect of the Chinese economy is the resilience of growth, 
concurrent with increasing disparities. This is a pattern that could be explained straightforwardly 
by the phenomenon of cellularity. Chinese provinces are relatively autonomous in terms of growth 
dynamics. That means, in turn, that they have to build on their internal capacities to foster growth. 
This implies that generic aspects of the Chinese transition (liberalization, business culture etc.) 
support a generic regime of high growth, which, however, translates into divergent growth if local 
capacities differ, and if growth spillovers are weak.  State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Local Moran’s I 
Note: I denotes internal borders only, IE internal and external borders 
 
Prefecture  Local Moran's I  z-statistics  p-value  Border 
Wuzhong  -5.805  -8.313  0.000  IE 
Hefei  -1.114  -2.259  0.012  I 
Liuzhou  -1.266  -1.808  0.035  IE 
Yingtan  -1.494  -1.507  0.066  IE 
Yinchuan  -0.928  -1.324  0.093  I 
Songyuan  -0.456  -1.224  0.111   
Qingyuan  -0.445  -1.105  0.135   
Heyuan  -0.475  -1.074  0.141   
Tongling  -0.604  -1.054  0.146   
Chaohu  -0.353  -1.011  0.156   
Yingkou  -0.427  -0.743  0.229   
Qinhuangdao  -0.337  -0.678  0.249   
Chuzhou  -0.205  -0.582  0.280   
Jiangmen  -0.247  -0.554  0.290   
Cangzhou  -0.246  -0.552  0.290   
Zhaoqing  -0.271  -0.544  0.293   
Huzhou  -0.265  -0.531  0.298   
Changsha  -0.215  -0.527  0.299   
Shaoguan  -0.189  -0.462  0.322   
Zhangjiakou  -0.215  -0.429  0.334   
Huizhou  -0.172  -0.419  0.338   
Beijing  -0.163  -0.397  0.346   
Langfang  -0.197  -0.393  0.347   
Fushun  -0.167  -0.371  0.355   
Foshan  -0.14  -0.367  0.357   
Tongchuan  -0.192  -0.329  0.371   
Panjin  -0.184  -0.317  0.376   
Puyang  -0.133  -0.293  0.385   
Nanning  -0.156  -0.266  0.395   
Baoji  -0.13  -0.256  0.399   
Xianyang  -0.109  -0.24  0.405   
Changchun  -0.12  -0.236  0.407   
Weinan  -0.097  -0.212  0.416   
Jiujiang  -0.084  -0.199  0.421   
Xingtai  -0.071  -0.167  0.434   
Xiamen  -0.121  -0.167  0.434   State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
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Baishan  -0.113  -0.156  0.438   
Kaifeng  -0.078  -0.151  0.440   
Tianshui  -0.141  -0.138  0.445   
Guigang  -0.071  -0.136  0.446   
Leshan  -0.096  -0.132  0.447   
Tonghua  -0.057  -0.131  0.448   
Quzhou  -0.06  -0.113  0.455   
Benxi  -0.05  -0.105  0.458   
Nanjing  -0.034  -0.075  0.470   
Fangchenggang  -0.057  -0.075  0.470   
Maanshan  -0.045  -0.071  0.472   
Dezhou  -0.035  -0.07  0.472   
Shaoxing  -0.035  -0.07  0.472   
Huludao  -0.043  -0.069  0.473   
Jinan  -0.033  -0.065  0.474   
Huangshan  -0.041  -0.064  0.474   
Luohe  -0.043  -0.056  0.478   
Zhenjiang  -0.03  -0.053  0.479   
Xinxiang  -0.02  -0.046  0.482   
Datong  -0.021  -0.029  0.489   
Yangzhou  -0.015  -0.027  0.489   
Anshan  -0.013  -0.025  0.490   
Xuzhou  -0.014  -0.024  0.490   
Qinzhou  -0.015  -0.024  0.490   
Jilin  -0.009  -0.013  0.495   
Nanchong  -0.009  -0.01  0.496   
Jingdezhen  -0.013  -0.008  0.497   
Hangzhou  -0.006  -0.005  0.498   
Huainan  -0.004  0.001  0.499   
Taizhou  0  0.008  0.497   
Jinhua  0.001  0.01  0.496   
Dandong  0  0.01  0.496   
Liaoyuan  0.002  0.013  0.495   
Liaoyang  0.002  0.013  0.495   
Baicheng  0.003  0.015  0.494   
Xuchang  0.008  0.026  0.490   
Zhuzhou  0.008  0.028  0.489   
Huaibei  0.012  0.033  0.487   
Ganzhou  0.009  0.033  0.487   
Dalian  0.016  0.035  0.486   
Jinzhou  0.011  0.037  0.485   
Suqian  0.02  0.061  0.476   
Yancheng  0.029  0.075  0.470   
Wenzhou  0.057  0.087  0.465   
Nanchang  0.083  0.088  0.465   
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Baiyin  0.084  0.089  0.465   
Qujing  0.061  0.094  0.463   
Weihai  0.091  0.097  0.461   
Guang'an  0.045  0.101  0.460   
Xi'an  0.051  0.112  0.455   
Shangqiu  0.053  0.118  0.453   
Yibin  0.066  0.123  0.451   
Shanghai  0.066  0.125  0.450   
Chenzhou  0.047  0.129  0.449   
Hebi  0.089  0.133  0.447   
Dazhou  0.061  0.134  0.447   
Suzhou  0.055  0.135  0.446   
Lianyungang  0.055  0.135  0.446   
Taizhou  0.05  0.136  0.446   
Nanyang  0.049  0.145  0.443   
Zhuhai  0.07  0.15  0.440   
Sanmenxia  0.083  0.154  0.439   
Guiyang  0.156  0.162  0.436   
Nantong  0.07  0.17  0.432   
Putian  0.118  0.175  0.431   
Ningbo  0.083  0.178  0.429   
Zigong  0.086  0.184  0.427   
Huai'an  0.078  0.188  0.426   
Xiangtan  0.089  0.19  0.424   
Pingdingshan  0.08  0.192  0.424   
Jiaxing  0.073  0.195  0.423   
Pingxiang  0.135  0.2  0.421   
Yangquan  0.113  0.207  0.418   
Shenyang  0.067  0.208  0.418   
Anyang  0.088  0.21  0.417   
Chengdu  0.233  0.24  0.405   
Changzhou  0.103  0.244  0.404   
Neijiang  0.138  0.25  0.401   
Chongqing  0.091  0.259  0.398   
Jining  0.11  0.26  0.397   
Linyi  0.086  0.262  0.397   
Jincheng  0.145  0.262  0.397   
Handan  0.102  0.265  0.395   
liuan  0.096  0.271  0.393   
Liaocheng  0.108  0.281  0.389   
Wuhu  0.157  0.284  0.388   
Rizhao  0.157  0.284  0.388   
Nanping  0.122  0.288  0.387   
Bengbu  0.116  0.302  0.381   
Baoding  0.11  0.311  0.378   
Weifang  0.121  0.314  0.377   State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 137  41 
 
Suining  0.148  0.347  0.364   
Hanzhong  0.169  0.352  0.362   
Zhoushan  0.347  0.356  0.361   
Laiwu  0.213  0.382  0.351   
Zaozhuang  0.215  0.386  0.350   
Xinyang  0.155  0.398  0.345   
Liupanshui  0.41  0.419  0.338   
Yulin  0.165  0.423  0.336   
Zunyi  0.239  0.428  0.334   
Yantai  0.239  0.428  0.334   
Bozhou  0.186  0.434  0.332   
Suzhou  0.188  0.439  0.331   
Haikou  0.303  0.44  0.330   
Jinzhong  0.172  0.44  0.330   
Fuyang  0.213  0.442  0.329   
Shuangyashan  0.253  0.452  0.326   
Tangshan  0.225  0.466  0.320   
Anqing  0.2  0.466  0.320   
Zhangjiajie  0.33  0.479  0.316   
Hegang  0.331  0.481  0.315   
Yueyang  0.19  0.485  0.314   
Dongying  0.337  0.489  0.312   
Zibo  0.196  0.503  0.308   
Longyan  0.217  0.504  0.307   
Luzhou  0.226  0.525  0.300   
Zhanjiang  0.254  0.526  0.299   
Changzhi  0.227  0.528  0.299   
Qingdao  0.298  0.533  0.297   
Siping  0.212  0.542  0.294   
Shijiazhuang  0.235  0.547  0.292   
Deyang  0.323  0.576  0.282   
Zhengzhou  0.226  0.577  0.282   
Shanwei  0.279  0.578  0.282   
Guizhou  0.25  0.58  0.281   
Tianjin  0.281  0.581  0.280   
Tai'an  0.229  0.585  0.279   
Hengshui  0.268  0.62  0.268   
Loudi  0.247  0.63  0.264   
Yangjiang  0.37  0.659  0.255   
Tieling  0.29  0.671  0.251   
Fuxin  0.329  0.679  0.249   
Yongzhou  0.294  0.681  0.248   
Wuxi  0.331  0.682  0.247   
Yiyang  0.307  0.71  0.239   
Qitaihe  0.31  0.716  0.237   
Guangyuan  0.403  0.717  0.237   State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
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Jiamusi  0.321  0.741  0.229   
Meizhou  0.27  0.743  0.229   
Shiyan  0.425  0.756  0.225   
Kunming  0.54  0.78  0.218   
Mianyang  0.391  0.805  0.210   
Zhongshan  0.394  0.811  0.209   
Beihai  0.477  0.846  0.199   
Taiyuan  0.603  0.871  0.192   
Harbin  0.291  0.911  0.181   
Wuhan  0.364  0.922  0.178   
Sanya  0.922  0.937  0.174   
Changde  0.401  1.016  0.155   
Jixi  0.579  1.026  0.152   
Quanzhou  0.421  1.065  0.144   
Ningde  0.607  1.075  0.141   
Luoyang  0.471  1.083  0.139   
Jiaozuo  0.532  1.092  0.137   
Sanming  0.482  1.109  0.134   
Hengyang  0.445  1.125  0.130   
Huaihua  0.415  1.136  0.128   
Mudanjiang  0.648  1.148  0.125   
Chengde  0.479  1.21  0.113   
Xianning  0.539  1.239  0.108   
Huangshi  0.54  1.241  0.107   
Wuzhou  0.506  1.279  0.101   
Ezhou  0.724  1.281  0.100   
Maoming  0.6  1.377  0.084  IE 
Daqing  0.601  1.382  0.084  IE 
Yuxi  1.367  1.387  0.083  I 
Guangzhou  0.548  1.496  0.067  I 
Zhangzhou  0.668  1.534  0.062  IE 
Fuzhou  0.723  1.659  0.049  I 
Wuhai  1.668  1.692  0.045  IE 
Yichun  0.843  1.932  0.027  I 
Chaoyang  0.75  2.043  0.021  I 
Heihe  1.19  2.101  0.018  I 
Shizuishan  1.485  2.134  0.016  IE 
Suizhou  0.945  2.165  0.015  IE 
Yunfu  0.863  2.17  0.015  IE 
Qiqihar  1.192  2.436  0.007  IE 
Shaoyang  1.076  2.465  0.007  IE 
Yichang  1.208  2.467  0.007  IE 
Chifeng  1.435  2.532  0.006  IE 
Chaozhou  1.386  2.83  0.002  IE 
Shantou  1.988  2.855  0.002  I 
Xiangfan  1.249  2.858  0.002  IE State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
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Huanggang  1.063  3.099  0.001  IE 
Tongliao  1.074  3.13  0.001  IE 
Jingzhou  1.291  3.243  0.001  IE 
Suihua  1.309  3.289  0.001  IE 
Jieyang  1.715  3.499  0.000  I 
Xiaogan  1.538  3.518  0.000  IE 
Shuozhou  2.58  3.704  0.000  IE 
Shenzhen  3.238  4.647  0.000  I 
Dongguan  2.66  4.687  0.000  I 
Jingmen  2.137  4.883  0.000  I 
Yulin  4.659  6.684  0.000  IE 
Yan'an  4.013  8.177  0.000  I 
Baotou  9.002  9.108  0.000  I 
Hohhot  6.92  9.924  0.000  IE 
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TableA2: Summary statistics and description of variables 
Variable  Description  Region  No. 
obs. 
Mean  Std. dev.  Min  Max 
Whole 
prefecture 
234  1.133  0.044  1.035  1.344  GRP growth   Average  growth  rate  of  inflation 
corrected  GRP  (calculated  as  GRPt  / 
GRPt-1)  Prefectural 
capital 
234  1.162  0.089  0.937  2.033 
Whole 
prefecture 
234  2.085,201  2,399,779  163,873.8  22,043,930  Initial GRP  GRP of the year 2000 (RMB 10,000) 
Prefectural 
capital 
234  1,054,551  1,991,835  67,428.63  19,852,150 
Whole 
prefecture 
234  1.011  0.030  0.956  1.341  Population growth   Average growth rate of the population 
(calculated as population / populationt-
1)  Prefectural 
capital 
234  1.048  0.105  0.959  1.848 
Whole 
prefecture 
234  2,865,370  3,744,589  264,253.8  30,921,160  Investment  Average  total  investments  in  fixed 
assets, RMB 10,000 
Prefectural 
capital 
234  1,783,986  3,301,368  67,689.57  30,318,940 
Whole 
prefecture 
234  0.067  0.011  0.045  0.122  Education  Average  number  of  students  in  the 
secondary  education  facilities  per 
person of its population  Prefectural 
capital 
234  0.076  0.019  0.037  0.157 
Whole 
prefecture 
234  15.961  7.374  4.481  68.810  Healthcare  Average number of medical doctors in 
the prefecture per person of its popula-
tion  Prefectural 
capital 
234  28.516  10.983  4.570  85.543 
Own expenditures  Average total public expenditures of a 
particular prefecture (values for 2002-
2007  have  been  inflation-corrected 
using provincial CPI) (10 bln. RMB) 
Whole 
prefecture 
234  0.315  0.581  0.040  6.459 
Neighbouring  
expenditures 
Average sum of the total public expen-
ditures  of  all  prefectures  sharing 
common  border  with  this  particular 
prefecture (10 bln. RMB) 
Whole 
prefecture 




Average sum of the total public expen-
ditures  of  all  prefectures  sharing 
common  border  with  this  particular 
prefecture,  if  this  border  does  not 








Average sum of the total public expen-
ditures  of  all  prefectures  sharing 
common  border  with  this  particular 
prefecture, if this border coincides with 
a provincial border (10 bln. RMB) 
Whole 
prefecture 
138  0.935  1.466  0.051  7.727 
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Note: all variables for the period of 2001-2007, reported by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. All variables 
(with the exception of the expenditures) have been calculated for the whole prefecture and for the prefectural capital, 
and hence, two sets of summary statistics are reported 
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